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From the "Battle in Seattle" at the World Trade Organization (WTO)
meeting of 1999 to the violent protests against the Free Trade Agreement
of the Americas at the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City in 2001,
international meetings related to trade negotiations have been marred by
protesters. A new term, "globophobics" has been coined to describe these
protesters. While they consist of a loose coalition of anti-trade forces,
ranging from organized labour to anarchists, environmental activists are
usually prominent. While objections of environmentalists to trade
agreements are not new, there is a new round of world trade negotiations
being launched, and an ongoing trade policy debate in Washington, D.C.
that involves the relationship between trade and environment.
In November 2001, the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar
placed the issue of the relationship between WTO rules and multilateral
environmental agreements (MEAs) on the negotiating agenda.' It is thus
timely to check the progress being made in the relationship between the
global trading system and global environmental protection agreements,
and to consider whether the WTO needs to make changes to the current
provisions relating to multilateral environmental protection agreements.
tProfessor of International Law and Business, Escuela de Negocios, Instituto Tecnol6gico
Aut6nomo de Mexico, Mexico City, Mexico; B.A., University of British Columbia, 1985;
LL.B., McGill University, 1988; LL.M., University of Calgary, 1993. 1 would like to thank
the reviewers for making constructive suggestions about the article. As a result, the final
product is much better. I alone am responsible for the views expressed herein.
1. See Ministerial Declaration, Ministerial Conference, WT/MIN(01)IDEC/1, para. 31
(Nov. 14, 2001), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/GENviewerwindow.asp?D:/DDF
DOCUMENTS/T/WT/MINO/DEC1 .DOC.HTM.
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This article considers how conflicts between international trade
agreements and multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) should be
resolved. The circumstances in which a nation may use trade restrictions to
achieve environmental objectives outside its own jurisdiction are limited
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),' under
international law, and under Article 104 of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA).3 NAFTA Article 104 uses a conflicts clause
to resolve the issue more clearly than the GATT.4 However, such a
conflicts clause may not be appropriate for the GAIT, or other WTO
agreements, which focus overwhelmingly on non-environmental issues
among an economically diverse and geographically dispersed 140
countries! Moreover, existing WTO provisions already provide
mechanisms to address conflicts between trade and multilateral
environmental protection, notably Article XX, the WTO Preamble, the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes (DSU) Article 3(2) and the Understanding on Trade and
Environment. Thus, there may be no need to introduce substantive
changes to the WTO, despite the extensive criticism of the existing trade
law regime by environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and
academic commentators and the numerous proposals that have been made
for reforms. Indeed, the more carefully one analyses the existing regime,
the more one appreciates the wisdom of those who created it.
Rather than attempt to alter or add to the existing WTO provisions, it
would be more appropriate to use conflicts clauses in MEAs that contain
specific obligations to use trade restrictions or give their signatories
discretion to employ trade measures. While a conflicts clause such as
2. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATT].
3. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 296 [hereinafter
NAFrA].
4. For a comparison of approaches to trade and environment in the WTO, NAFTA and
the European Union, see Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU,
NAFTA and WTO: Regional Trajectories of Rule Development, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 231
(1997); see also Bradly J. Condon, Reconciling Trade and Environment: A Legal Analysis of
European and North American Approaches, 8 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2000).
5. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. While the Preamble recognizes sustainable
development and environmental protection as concerns that should be taken into account
in the pursuit of trade liberalization, these references apply to the interpretation of the
WTO Agreements, rather than impose obligations to protect the environment.
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NAFTA Article 104 may be appropriate for a regional trade agreement
among countries that share a regional environment and have
environmental cooperation systems in place,6 such a clause would be
impractical in a global trade agreement that contains far greater diversity
of members with respect to environmental conditions, technological
capacity, financial means, economic priorities, and legal systems. Most
signatories to MEAs are likely to be members of the WTO, and it is not
unreasonable to ask them to turn their minds to the issue of a conflicts
clause for trade measures when drafting or amending MEAs.
To date, there have been no GATT or WTO cases challenging trade
measures taken pursuant to an MEA. There have been three cases in
which the issue of potential conflicts between WTO obligations and MEAs
have been raised: Tuna I, Tuna H and Shrimp. In all three cases,
GAT-/WTO panels have ruled against United States measures that were
discriminatory, unilateral and extraterritorial. In each case, the United
States used these measures in an effort to coerce mainly developing
countries into adopting U.S. environmental policies. Moreover, the
interpretative approach taken by WTO panels has evolved with the
addition of interpretative provisions to the WTO Agreements that resulted
from the Uruguay Round negotiations. In all three cases, the decisions
reached were correct in law and just in their result. The application of the
rules of international trade in these cases produced precisely the result
they were designed to achieve, limiting the ability of an economically
powerful state to abuse weaker countries.
This article begins with a review of the approach taken in the Tuna
and Shrimp cases to the extraterritorial application of United States
environmental policy using trade restrictions. This analysis will consider to
what extent the GATT permits the use of trade measures to implement
6. See The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Between the
Government of Canada, the Government of the United Mexican States and the
Government of the United States of America, Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480; see also Sarah
Richardson, Sovereignty Revisited: Sovereignty, Trade and the Environment-The North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 183 (1998); Bradly
J. Condon, NAFTA and the Environment: A Trade-Friendly Approach, 14 Nw. INT'L L. &
Bus. 528 (1994).
7. GA'TT Secretariat, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, WT/DS21/R,
Sept. 3, 1991, 30 1.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna I]. Also available from WTO, Centre
William Rappard, Rue de Lausanne 154, 1211 Geneva 21, Switzerland (all references are to
the page numbers of the WTO copy of the report). GATT Secretariat, United States-
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, WT/DS29/R, June 16, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994)
[hereinafter Tuna I]. United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, Oct. 12, 1998, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/GENviewer
window.asp?D:DDFDOCUMENTSIT/WT/DS/58ABR.DOC.HTM [hereinafter Shrimp].
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international environmental obligations, and the distinction between
measures taken pursuant to international agreements and measures taken
unilaterally. 8 Next, this article considers the application of the least-trade-
restrictive rule to trade measures taken to pursue international
environmental goals as it has been applied under the GATT and in
NAFTA Article 104. Finally, this article considers whether reforms to the
WTO are really necessary to avoid conflicts between international trade
law and international environmental protection.
II. THE TUNA AND SHRIMP CASES
In the 1990s, GATT and WTO panels considered the GAT[
consistency of United States laws that used unilateral trade embargoes to
protect marine mammals in three cases. The first two cases, banning tuna
imports to protect dolphins, were considered under GATT 1947, and were
never adopted by the GATT. The third case, banning shrimp imports to
protect sea turtles, was considered under GATT 1994.9 The panel decision
8. The common law concept of stare decisis does not apply to WTO Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB) rulings, which are not legally binding interpretations of the WTO Agreements
in the way that decisions of common-law judges are binding with respect to legislation. See
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, Annex 2, vol. 31,
33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994), art. 3(2) [hereinafter DSU]. In practice, however, past rulings are
taken into account by the DSB when interpreting WTO obligations. It is also important to
note that GATT 1947, under which the Mexican Tuna case was decided, is legally distinct
from GATF 1994, under which the Shrimp case was decided. See WTO Agreement, supra
note 5, art. 11(4). However, the wording of GATT 1947, Article XX was not changed in
GATT 1994. What did change was the incorporation of environmental concerns in the
WTO Agreement Preamble, which affects the interpretation of GATT Article XX. In
addition, the DSU expressly incorporates the customary rules of interpretation of public
international law, while the GAIT 1947 did not. See DSU, supra art. 3(2). However, this
should be viewed as a codification rather than a substantive change.
9. The two GAT agreements are essentially the same, but the Uruguay Round
integrated the GATT into a new framework of several agreements under the
administration of the World Trade Organization. While the relevant exceptions in Article
XX of GATT 1947 and GATT 1994 are the same, the interpretation of the latter may differ
due to the introduction of new references to environmental protection and sustainable
development in the WTO Preamble, and the explicit reference to the customary rules of
interpretation of customary international law in Article 3(2) of the new DSU. It was more
difficult to have panel decisions adopted under the old GATT because the requirement for
unanimous agreement essentially gave each contracting party a veto. The new DSU created
an Appellate Body to hear appeals of panel decisions on issues of law and legal
interpretations. See DSU, supra note 8, art. 17(1), (7). The DSU eliminated the veto by
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was appealed to the Appellate Body and the modified decision was
adopted by the WTO.
The analysis in this section focuses only on those aspects of the cases
that are relevant to the issue of MEAs.
A. Tuna I
In 1991, the United States banned tuna imports from several
countries, including Mexico, pursuant to its Marine Mammal Protection
Act of 1972 (MMPA).1° The stated purpose of the United States tuna
embargo was to discourage fishing methods that kill dolphins in
international waters." However, the MMPA provisions gave no regard to
requiring the adoption of the AB decision unless there is unanimous agreement against
adoption.
10. Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (1972), as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-711, 102
Stat. 4755 (1988), and Pub. L. No. 101-627, 104 Stat. 4467 (1990) (codified in part at 16
U.S.C. § 1361(ff)) cited in Tuna I, supra note 7, at 3 [hereinafter MMPA]. The Marine
Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA), generally prohibits hunting, capturing, killing or
importing marine mammals into the United States without authorization. Section 101(a)(2)
authorizes limited incidental taking of marine mammals by U.S. commercial fishermen
under permits issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). Under section
101(a)(2)(B) of the MMPA, the importation of yellow-fin tuna harvested with purse-seine
nets in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP) is prohibited unless the country in
question proves through documentary evidence that its regulatory regime is comparable to
that of the United States and its dolphin-kill rates are comparable. The regulatory regime
must include the same prohibitions the United States applies to its own vessels and the
average incidental dolphin kill must not exceed 1.25 times the average kill of United States
vessels in the same period. Section 101(a)(2)(C) of the MMPA requires intermediary
nations exporting yellow-fin tuna products to the United States to certify and prove that it
prohibits imports of tuna from any nations directly embargoed by the United States. If they
do not, they too are subject to the embargo. On October 10, 1990, the U.S., pursuant to
court order, imposed an embargo on imports of tuna from Mexico. The embargo went into
effect on February 22, 1991. See Tuna I, supra note 7, at 3-5; see also Earth Island Institute
v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964, 976 (N.D. Cal. 1990), affd, 929 F. 2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the Secretaries of Commerce and the Treasury may not allow imports of
yellow-fin tuna into the United States from any nation that does not conform with the 1988
MMPA amendments); Ted L. McDorman, The GATT Consistency of U.S. Fish Import
Embargoes to Stop Drifinet Fishing and Save Whales, Dolphins and Turtles, 24 GEO. WASH.
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 477,495 n.130 (1991).
11. For the historical background of international conflicts over tuna fishing and the
relationship between dolphins and tuna in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean see R.
Rosendahl, The Development of Mexican Fisheries and its Effect on United States-Mexican
Relations, 3 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1 (1984); Kerry L. Holland, Exploitation on Porpoise:
The Use of Purse Seine Nets by Commercial Tuna Fishermen in the Eastern Tropical Pacific
Ocean, 17 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 267 (1991); T. Steiner, The Senseless Slaughter of
Marine Mammals, 61 Bus. & Soc. REV. 18 (1987); E. Christensen & S. Geffin, GATT Sets
its Net on Environmental Regulation: The GA TT Panel Ruling on Mexican Yellow-fin Tuna
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whether the foreign fishing activity that resulted in the incidental taking of
marine mammals was conducted wholly within the waters of another state
and was consistent with that state's domestic and international law
obligations.'2 In all of the cases in which import bans were imposed, the
fishing activity of the foreign fishermen was consistent with that state's
international legal rights pursuant to international treaty and customary
international law.13 While the dolphins being protected were listed as at
risk of becoming endangered under the Convention on International
14Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), CITES neither required nor
authorised the ban on trade in tuna. Mexico challenged the embargo as a
disguised trade barrier that was inconsistent with the United States'
obligations under the GATT.
B. Tuna II
In the second Tuna case, 5 the European Economic Community
(EEC) and the Netherlands challenged the trade provisions of the MMPA,
as amended by the International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992.16
C. Shrimp
In the Shrimp case, the United States banned shrimp imports from
WTO members that did not comply with U.S. legal requirements regarding
the protection of sea turtles from incidental death in the shrimp harvesting
process. The United States negotiated and concluded a regional
international agreement on sea turtle protection and conservation with
some countries, but not others who were affected by the trade ban. Article
Imports and the Need for Reform of the International Trading System, 23 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REV. 569, 572 n.9 (1991). Intentional encirclement of dolphins with purse-seine nets
is used as a tuna fishing technique only in the ETP. See Tuna I, supra note 7, at 2. The
MMPA prevents American fleets from using this method of tuna fishing. See Divine
Porpoise, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 5, 1991, at 31; McDorman, supra note 10; and Tuna I,
supra note 7.
12. McDorman, supra note 10, at 492.
13. Id. at 495.
14. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3, 1973,27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
15. Tuna II, supra note 7. For a more detailed discussion of Tuna II, see inter alia,
Joseph. J. Urgese, Dolphin Protection and the Mammal Protection Act Have Met Their
Match: The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 31 AKRON L. REV. 457 (1998).
16. See 138 CONG. REC. H9064-02 (1992) and Subchapter IV of the MMPA, 16 U.S.C. §§
1411-1418 (1992). For a detailed discussion of the Tuna cases from a political economy
perspective, see Richard W. Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the
Global Commons: What We Can Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1999).
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XV of the Inter-American Convention included a conflicts clause that
states:
1. In implementing this Convention, the Parties shall act in accordance
with the provisions of the Agreement establishing the World Trade
Organisation (WTO), as adopted at Marrakesh in 1994, including its
annexes.
2. In particular, and with respect to the subject matter of this
Convention, the Parties shall act in accordance with the provisions of
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade contained in Annex 1
of the WTO Agreement, as well as Article XI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1994.
The United States gave some countries three years to introduce
"turtle exclusion devices" (TEDs), while others were given only four
months. All species of turtles involved were listed as being under threat of
extinction under CITES Appendix I, and occurred in U.S. territorial
waters as part of their migratory route.17
17. For a detailed review of the U.S. legislation, litigation to enforce the legislation, and
the amendments and negotiations that occurred after the WTO case, see Eric L. Richards
and Martin A. McCrory, The Sea Turtle Dispute: Implications for Sovereignty, the
Environment, and International Trade Law, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 295 (2000). For a variety
of interpretations of the Shrimp decision, see Joseph R. Berger, Unilateral Trade Measures
to Conserve the World's Living Resources: An Environmental Breakthrough for the GA TT
in the WTO Sea Turtle Case, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 355 (1999) (taking the view that the
Shrimp case represents a positive evolution in the treatment of conservation measures);
Benjamin Simmons, In Search of Balance: An Analysis of the WTO Shrimp/Turtle Appellate
Body Report, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 413 (1999) (arguing in favour of unilateral measures);
Shannon Hudnall, Towards a Greener International Trade System: Multilateral
Environmental Agreements and the World Trade Organization, 29 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 175 (1996) (arguing that the GATT needs to be changed to respond to
environmental concerns); Jennifer A. Bernazani, The Eagle, the Turtle, the Shrimp and the
WTO: Implications for the Future of Environmental Trade Measures, 15 CONN. J. INT'L. L.
207 (2000) (proposing the addition of an exception to Article XX specifically for MEAs);
Axel Bree, Article XX GATT-Quo Vadis? The Environmental Exception After the
Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, 17 DICK. J. INT'L L. 99 (1998) (interpreting the
decision of the Appellate Body as finding that the U.S. measure did not have extra
jurisdictional effect); Terence P. Stewart & Mara M. Burr, Trade and Domestic Protection
of Endangered Species: Peaceful Co-existence or Continued Conflict? The Shrimp-Turtle
Dispute and the World Trade Organization, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y. REV. 109
(1998); Matthew Brotmann, The Clash Between the WTO and the ESA: Drowning a Turtle
to Eat a Shrimp, 16 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 321 (1999); Ryan L. Winter, Reconciling the
GATT and WTO With Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Can We Have Our Cake
and Eat it Too?, 11 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 223 (2000) (arguing that a conflict
between the WTO and MEAs is inevitable).
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It bears repeating that, in each of these cases, the United States'
measures were unilateral, discriminatory, extraterritorial, and not taken
pursuant to MEAs.
III. JURISDICTION: INTERNAL VERSUS EXTRATERRITORIAL
ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS
One issue before the Tuna and Shrimp panels was whether a state
might employ trade restrictions to indirectly exercise jurisdiction over
environmental issues arising outside its territory. The GAT is silent on
the validity of measures directed toward the conservation of marine
mammals outside the territories of individual contracting parties.
In Tuna I, the United States took the position that a government
could unilaterally decide to prohibit imports of a product in order to
18protect the life of humans, plants or animals outside its jurisdiction. The
United States argued that the MMPA did not subordinate the legislation
of other parties to its own, but simply specified the requirements for tuna
imported into the United States. Moreover, nothing in Article XX
supported the assertion that the United States legislation was applied
extraterritorially, since trade measures by nature had effects outside a
contracting party's territory. 19 It argued further that the GATIT should not
be interpreted to require a country to allow access to its market that served
as an incentive to deplete the populations of species that are vital
components of the ecosystem. Finally, the United States implied that,
because CITES obliged a member party to prohibit imports in order to
protect endangered species found only outside its own jurisdiction,
international law permitted a state to use trade restrictions to pursue
extraterritorial environmental policy objectives.2°
Mexico argued that Article XX was confined to measures a party
could adopt or apply within its own territory.2' Nothing in Article XX
entitled any contracting party to impose measures whose implementation
would subordinate the legislation of one party to the legislation of another.
18. Tuna 1, supra note 7, at 16-22 (submissions of the U.S.).
19. Id.
20. Id. In this case, CITES did not include in its Appendix I list of species in danger of
extinction any of the species of dolphins, which the U.S. was claiming to protect. The
dolphins actually threatened with extinction were found only outside the ETP and were not
protected by the U.S. legislation. U.S. and international data indicated that no dolphin
populations in the ETP were threatened with extinction. Id. at 20. However, the three ETP
species are listed in Appendix II of CITES, which includes species that may be threatened
if trade is not restricted. See Christensen & Geffin, supra note 11, at 595 n.118.
21. Tuna I, supra note 7, at 16-17 (submissions of Mexico).
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To accept that one party could impose trade restrictions to conserve
resources in international areas or within the territories of other parties
would introduce the concept of extraterritoriality into the GATT and be
contrary to international law. '
In the Tuna I case, Canada stated the issue as being when and to what
extent measures taken relating to unilaterally set conservation objectives
can be extended to areas outside national jurisdictions. The United States
would have to demonstrate that Mexico's incidental dolphin mortality in
waters outside United States jurisdiction impinged on its conservation
program to an extent that would allow justification of the embargo under
Article XX(g). 3 Canada thus implied that a state should be permitted to
exercise jurisdiction over extraterritorial environmental matters in so far as
it was necessary to effectively manage a related internal environmental
matter, even if it involved taking measures in the absence of any
international agreement on the issue. However, the Canadian submission
did not clarify the set of circumstances that might justify such actions in the
context of Article XX(g).
The Tuna I panel noted that the GATT text in Article XX(b) did not
clearly say whether it "covers measures necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health outside the jurisdiction of the contracting
party taking the measure. 24 However, the drafting history of Article
XX(b) indicated it did not.2' The panel reasoned that:
[T]his paragraph of Article XX was intended to allow contracting
parties to impose trade restrictive measures inconsistent with the
General Agreement to pursue overriding public policy goals to the
extent that such inconsistencies were unavoidable .. . . [I]f the broad
interpretation suggested by the United States were accepted, each
contracting party could unilaterally determine the life or health
protection policies from which other contracting parties could not
deviate without jeopardizing their rights under the General Agreement.
The General Agreement would then no longer constitute a multilateral
framework for trade among all contracting parties but would provide
legal security only in respect of trade between a limited number of
26
contracting parties with identical internal regulations.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 26 (submissions of Canada).
24. Id. at 45.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 40.
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For the same reason, Article XX(g) only permitted measures aimed at
resource conservation within the jurisdiction of the enacting country.
Moreover, according to Article XX(g), those measures had to be taken "in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption." A
country can effectively control the production or consumption of a
27
resource only to the extent that it falls under its jurisdiction. Finally, the
panel expressed the view that its interpretation restricting environmental
measures to internal matters under Article XX "would affect neither the
rights of individual contracting parties to pursue their internal
environmental policies and to cooperate with one another in harmonizing
such policies. '"28
While not mentioned by the Tuna I panel in its decision, academics
have argued "that the Article XX exceptions are designed to allow a state
to protect vital internal resources and to pursue vital internal policies," not
"to project its internal policies and goals onto other states."29 Owen
Saunders comments:
While it is true that Article XX does not refer specifically to the health
of citizens of the acting state, this is certainly what must be inferred;
otherwise the GATT could be read as implicitly justifying far-reaching
intrusions on the territorial sovereignty of other states, an interpretation
27. Tuna I, supra note 7, at 41.
28. Id. at 45.
29. McDorman, supra note 10, at 520 (emphasis added). He cites in support of Jackson's
comments regarding Article XX(b): "[a~lthough the language is not explicitly restricted to
health and safety of the importing country, it can be argued that that is what Article XX
means." See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 209 (MIT Press, 1989). Jackson characterizes this
as an issue of equalizing competition where foreign manufacturers are subject to less
stringent environmental process standards. His opinion on this issue appears to have been
accepted by the panel in this case. He states:
Whether an importing nation could use border restrictions or taxes to
equalize the price of imported goods with domestic costs of health and
safety regulation is as yet an unresolved issue for the world trading
system. It is an issue fraught with dangerous potential. If this principle
were extended to many types of government regulation-for example
minimum wage or other labor regulations-it could be the basis of a rash
of import restrictions, often defeating the basic goals of comparative
advantage. Id.
He notes further that the GATT focuses on the product, not the production process. If a
production process in an exporting nation causes cross-border pollution in an importing
nation, the parties may use a bilateral or multilateral treaty to deal with the problem. See id.
at 208-10.
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that is unsupported on a reading of the Agreement and on the basis of
30state practice.
The Tuna I panel's ruling on this issue was thus consistent with
academic opinion regarding the scope of the Article XX exceptions and
the applicable principles of international law, namely those regarding state
sovereignty and extraterritoriality. The Tuna I interpretation of the GATT
does not permit a state to use trade restrictions to unilaterally assert
jurisdiction over environmental matters outside its national territory.
The Tuna II panel employed a different analysis than Tuna I, but
reached the same result. It applied a three-prong test to both Articles
XX(b) and XX(g). The first prong considered whether the MMPA
regulations qualified as measures to conserve "exhaustible natural
resources" under Article XX(g) and "to protect human, animal or plant
life or health" under Article XX(b). Despite arguments from the EEC and
the Netherlands that such measures could not be applied extraterritorially,
the panel held that neither article specifically limited the location of the
resource or animal in question.31 The panel reasoned that other provisions
in Article XX did not exclude measures aimed at actions outside a
contracting party's territorial jurisdiction and that international law
permitted states to regulate the conduct of their nationals outside their
territory.32
However, the U.S. measures failed to pass the second prong of the
test under either Article XX(b) or XX(g). The intermediary embargo
covered tuna imports from third countries-whether or not the tuna was
harvested in a manner that was harmful to dolphins. The primary embargo
permitted the applicable countries to harvest tuna in a manner that was
harmful to dolphins as long as their practices and policies were comparable
to U.S. standards. Thus, the U.S. trade measures could only accomplish
their objective by forcing other countries to adopt U.S.-style laws. This
could not be considered "necessary" under Article XX(b). Moreover, the
trade measures were not be considered-measures made effective in
conjunction with domestic measures as required under XX(g). Nor could
30. See J. OWEN SAUNDERS, Legal Aspects of Trade and Sustainable Development, in
THE LEGAL CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 370, 375 (1990). For a contrary
view, see Christensen & Geffin, supra note 11, at 582, 590.
31. Tuna II, supra note 7, at 891-92.
32. Id. The panel gave the example of Article XX(e), allowing measures "relating to the
products of prison labour," as one that clearly applied to extraterritorial subject matter. Id.
at 892. It also noted that a "state may in particular regulate the conduct of its fishermen, or
of vessels having its nationality or any fisherman on these vessels, with respect to fish
located in the high seas." Id.
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the measures be saved under the Preamble to Article XX, the third prong
of the test.
The Shrimp case added a new twist to the issue of jurisdiction. The
Shrimp panel held there was a sufficient nexus between the endangered,
migratory marine populations involved and the United States for the
purposes of Article XX(g), because all of the species occur in waters over
which the United States has jurisdiction, even though they migrate across
national borders and international waters. In this regard, the Shrimp
panel's reasoning resembles that of Canada's submission in the Tuna I
case. At the same time, however, the Shrimp panel expressly declined to
decide whether there is an implied jurisdictional limitation in Article
XX(g) and, if so, the nature or extent of that limitation. As with the
Canadian submission in the Tuna I case, the Shrimp panel recognised that
a state has a legitimate interest in the protection of migratory species that
occur within its territory. However, the more difficult issue of what
limitations to impose on a state's trade measures in these circumstances
remains unresolved.
As the Tuna I panel implied, international law regarding territorial
limits effectively prevents a nation state from taking unilateral measures to
conserve natural resources outside its territory. However, in the case of
endangered migratory species such as the turtles, failure to act would
threaten the ecosystem inside the nation's territory by permitting the
destruction of the species when its migration took it outside the territory.
The Shrimp panel appears to have solved this quandary by recognising that
the United States has some form of jurisdiction over the species, if not
over extraterritorial waters.
However, the Shrimp panel also implied that jurisdiction over the
turtle was shared by other nations. While it recognised the U.S. policy goal
as legitimate, it decided that the unilateral method of achieving that goal
was not. In an effort to balance the need to conserve the species against
the need to respect the legal rights of other nations, the panel ruled:
The parties to the Inter-American Convention together marked out the
equilibrium line ... and provides convincing demonstration that an
alternative course of action was reasonably open to the United States
for securing the legitimate policy goal of its measure, a course of action
other than the unilateral and non-consensual procedures of the import
13prohibition.
Tuna II and Shrimp opened the door for multilateral environmental
measures dealing with shared species and resources to be justified as
33. Shrimp, supra note 7, at 69-70.
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exceptions under Article XX. The Shrimp decision suggests that nations
may exercise shared jurisdiction over migratory species and the global
environment, although the exact scope of that jurisdiction is yet to be
defined. Because there is no express jurisdictional limit in Article XX,
trade measures taken pursuant to an MEA to protect the global commons
could be included in Article XX, even though the subject matter lies
outside the territorial limits of the parties to the MEA in whole or in part.
IV. MEASURES TAKEN UNDER MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS VERSUS
MEASURES TAKEN UNILATERALLY
An important issue that was raised in the Tuna and Shrimp cases was
whether any distinction should be made between trade measures taken
pursuant to multilateral environmental and conservation agreements and
those that are not. While unilateral measures may impinge upon state
sovereignty, this principle is not violated where the affected states agree
that trade restrictions may be employed under specific circumstances to
pursue specific environmental objectives. Indeed, GATT Articles XX(b)
and (g) are a good example of such an agreement. However, there is
nothing in Article XX that explicitly distinguishes between measures
34applied as part of an international agreement and other measures.
In Tuna I, Australia argued that where a contracting party takes a
measure with extraterritorial application outside of any international
framework of cooperation, it is appropriate for the GATT to scrutinise the
measure against the party's obligations under the GATT. In particular, any
measure involving conditional most-favoured-nation treatment "by way of
country-specific import prohibitions should be examined strictly, especially
in view of the history of disputes over tuna."35 Australia thus implied that
the existence of an international agreement dealing with the
extraterritorial application of such measures would be relevant to the
jurisdiction of the GATT to consider their validity under international law
36
and relevant to their consistency with the GATT.
The Tuna I panel ruled that the MMPA prohibition of imports of tuna
from Mexico was contrary to GAT Article XI:1 and not justified by
Articles XX(b) or XX(g). It concluded that
34. Tuna I, supra note 7, at 16-22 (submissions of the U.S.). The NAFTA does make
such a distinction. See art. 104, which is discussed infra note 76.
35. Tuna 1, supra note 7, at 26 (submissions of Australia).
36. Shrimp, supra note 7, at 17. This issue never arose in the Shrimp case, which only
dealt with the U.S. measures as it was applied unilaterally outside the context of any
international agreement with the affected countries.
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a contracting party may not restrict imports of a product merely because
it originates in a country with environmental policies different from its
own.., if the Contracting Parties were to permit import restrictions in
response to differences in environmental policies under the General
Agreement, they would need to impose limits on the range of policy
differences justifying such responses and to develop criteria so as to
prevent abuse.37
These statements infer that such measures would be inconsistent with
the GATT regardless of whether they were taken unilaterally or pursuant
to other multilateral agreements. However, the Tuna I panel also stated
that the prohibition of extraterritoriality would not affect "the right of the
Contracting Parties acting jointly to address international environmental
problems which can only be resolved through measures in conflict with the
present rules." 38 It thus implied that under certain circumstances the
distinction would be relevant to determining whether the use of such trade
measures would be permitted notwithstanding their inconsistency with the
GATT-those circumstances being a specific GATT amendment or
waiver.3 9 In other words, extraterritorial environmental considerations
could not justify restrictive trade practices under GATT Articles XX(b)
and (g), but trading partners could agree to subordinate their trade
obligations in respect of each other by entering into environmental
agreements that would prevail over the GAT. However, the panel did
not specify whether such agreements would have to expressly override the
GATT or whether they would merely need to do so implicitly.
Since the United States trade ban was not imposed pursuant to any
international agreement, there was no clear ruling on what relevance of
this distinction might have to the issue of extraterritoriality. The ruling
clearly limits the ability of a state to unilaterally decide that restricting
trade is the best way to protect the environment outside its own territory.
However, it implies that such measures could be ruled consistent with the
GATT if taken pursuant to a multilateral agreement whose provisions are
intended to operate notwithstanding any inconsistency with the GATT.
The panel's ruling was criticised for requiring nations to negotiate
international agreements and GATT waivers or amendments if they want
to use trade restrictions to implement international environmental policies.
But this is a reasonable position to take, given that such agreements may
alter international legal obligations, while the panel itself may not.
However, the ruling clearly requires that, if the rights and obligations of
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the GATT contracting parties are to be modified, the contracting parties
must modify them themselves-not dispute panels.40
The relevance of the distinction between measures taken under
MEAs versus measures taken unilaterally was also raised in the Shrimp
case. While the holding of the Appellate Body in the Shrimp case
recognised the U.S. measure as legitimate under Article XX(g), it
nevertheless struck down the measure because it was applied in a manner
that constituted arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination under the
chapeau of Article XX.4' The deciding factor was the unilateral nature of
U.S. actions against WTO members who had not participated in the Inter-
American Convention and the failure of the United States to give them the
same opportunity to achieve a negotiated solution.
The Appellate Body stated a clear preference for measures taken
under international agreements over measures taken unilaterally. This
aspect of the decision is consistent with the decision of the Tuna I panel,
and was backed up by the WTO Preamble and the Decision on Trade and
Environment that were incorporated by the Uruguay Round agreements.
The Appellate Body interpreted the Article XX chapeau in light of
the object and purpose of the WTO, which included, (1) seeking
cooperative solutions to trade problems and (2) to prevent the risk that a
multiplicity of conflicting trade requirements, justified under Article XX,
could emerge. The standards of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
required three elements: (1) the application of the measure must result in
discrimination; 2 (2) the discrimination must be arbitrary or unjustifiable in
character; and (3) the discrimination must be between countries where the
same conditions prevail. The purpose of the chapeau is to prevent the
abuse of the Article XX exceptions, and to strike a balance between the
40. This is confirmed by the DSU, which states: "Recommendations and rulings of the
DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered
agreements." DSU, supra note 8, art. 3(2).
41. GATI', supra note 2, art. XX. The Article XX chapeau reads: "Subject to the
requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade .. " Id.
42. Here, the Appellate Body adopted the view expressed in the Appellate Body
decision in United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
WT/DS2/9, May 20, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 274-75, 603 (1996), available at http://docsonline.
wto.org/GEN-viewerwindow.asp?D:/DDFDOCUMENTSrT/WTIDS/2R.WPF.HTM
[hereinafter Gasoline], that the nature of the discrimination between countries mentioned
in the chapeau is different from the discrimination between products, which is prohibited in
GATT Article III.
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right of a member to invoke an exception and its duty to respect the treaty
rights of other members.43
The Appellate Body ruled that the application of the U.S. measure
constituted unjustifiable discrimination on two grounds. First, the intended
and actual effect of the law was to coerce foreign governments to adopt
essentially the same policy and enforcement program as the United States
applied to its domestic shrimp trawlers, if they wished to exercise their
GATT rights. Secondly, the United States failed to engage in serious
negotiations to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements before
enforcing its import prohibition. The Appellate Body ruled further that
discrimination results not only when countries in which the same
conditions prevail are treated differently, but also when the application of
the measure does not take into account the appropriateness of the
regulatory program for the conditions prevailing in those exporting
countries.
While the basis for this point in the text of Article XX is not clear, the
Appellate Body makes an important point when it refers to the importance
of assessing the conditions prevailing in a given country in determining
what methods of multilateral environmental protection are appropriate.
The enforcement of environmental laws requires the dedication of human
and financial resources that some countries may not have, or that a country
may prefer to dedicate to other matters that it deems more important to
the welfare of its people. Differences in environmental conditions,
technological capacity, financial means, economic priorities, and legal
systems among the nations of the world make unilateral trade embargoes
an inferior means of achieving global environmental protection. It is
difficult to imagine the circumstances under which unilateral coercion
would prove more effective than multilateral negotiations in achieving
effective results.
The Appellate Body made it clear that when a WTO member chooses
to protect migratory species by way of unilateral trade action rather than
multilateral cooperation, such trade measures cannot be justified under the
chapeau of Article XX. It noted that the protection and conservation of
migratory species demands concerted and cooperative efforts on the part
of many countries. It cited the references in the Decision on Trade and
Environment to Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development and Agenda 21 as proof that the WTO has recognised both
43. Here, the Appellate Body invoked the principle of good faith, which includes the
doctrine of abus de droit; the latter prohibits the abusive exercise of a state's rights and
enjoins that whenever the assertion of a right "impinges on the field covered by [a] treaty
obligation, it must be exercised bona fide, that is to say, reasonably." See Shrimp, supra
note 7.
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the need for such cooperative efforts and the inappropriateness of
unilateral action in dealing with extraterritorial aspects of international
environmental problems.4 Finally, it found that the unilateral character of
the application of Section 609 heightened the disruptive and discriminatory
effect of the import prohibition and underscored its unjustifiability.
In addition to finding the application of the measure to be
unjustifiable, the Appellate Body found its application to be arbitrary
because there was no transparent, predictable certification process
followed by U.S. officials. Nor was there any review or appeal process that
could be followed in the event that an application for certification were
denied. In this regard, the U.S. measure also failed to meet minimum
standards of transparency and procedural fairness set out in GATT 1994
Article X:3.
Some kinds of unilateralism appear to be permitted by Article XX.
For example, Article XX(e) permits trade restrictions relating to the
products of prison labour and Article XX(f) permits trade restrictions
imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or
archeological value. The former is likely to take the form of import
restrictions while the latter is likely to take the form of export restrictions.
Neither category appears to require the prior negotiation of a multilateral
agreement. However, the Article XX preamble would prohibit the use of
44. Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development states:
"Unilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the
importing country should be avoided. Environmental measures addressing transboundary
or global environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based on international
consensus." Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., at
4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/5 (1992). The phrase, "as far as possible," appears to leave an
opening for a country to take unilateral action where efforts at international negotiation
fail, perhaps by invoking the doctrine of necessity. However, the doctrine of abus de droit
may prevent a WTO member from invoking the defense of necessity to justify trade
restrictions against another member. See Shrimp, supra note 7, at 50.
Agenda 21, para. 2.22(i) reads: "Avoid unilateral action to deal with environmental
challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing country. Environmental measures
addressing transborder global environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based
on an international consensus." U.N. Conference on Environment and Development,
Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, U.N. Doc. ST/DPI/1344,
U.N. Sales No. E. 931.11 (1992), para. 2.22(i).
The Appellate Body also cited Article 5 of the Convention on Biological Diversity
(requiring parties to cooperate in respect of areas beyond national jurisdiction for the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity) and the Convention on the
Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, which reads: "The contracting parties
[are] convinced that conservation and effective management of migratory species of wild
animals requires the concerted action of all States within the national boundaries of which
such species spend any part of their life cycle."
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these exceptions to justify arbitrary discrimination or disguised restrictions
on trade. Thus, the United States could not ban the import of any product
on the grounds that the exporting country employed prison labour-only
the actual production of prison labourers could be banned. Similarly,
Mexico could not ban imports from the United States on the grounds that
the United States failed to ban the import of Mexican archeological
artifacts. Mexico, however, would be free to ban the export of such items,
as indeed it has.
The general conclusion that can be drawn from these interpretations
of the provisions of the WTO Agreement, in particular the preamble, the
Decision on Trade and Environment and GATT Article XX, is that trade
measures taken pursuant to MEAs would be permissible if implemented in
a non-discriminatory and transparent manner. However, unilateral trade
measures aimed at changing the environmental policies of other nations
are not.
V. CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE GATT AND MULTILATERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS
As stated at the beginning of this article, no case has yet arisen in
which trade measures taken under an MEA have been challenged at the
GATT or WTO. However, the issue was raised in both the Tuna and
Shrimp cases.
The Tuna I panel failed to directly address the issue of what would
happen should there arise a conflict between the GAT trade obligations
and inconsistent trade obligations imposed under multilateral
environmental agreements such as the Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species.45
The United States indirectly raised this issue in noting that a CITES
party was obliged to prohibit imports in order to protect endangered
species found outside its own jurisdiction.4 Australia also raised this issue
by taking the position that a GATI panel could not resolve conflicts
between a contracting party's international trade obligations under the
45. Such a case has not arisen to date, and is unlikely to be brought by a signatory to an
MEA. If such an issue does come before a WTO panel, it would likely be in relation to non-
parties to an MEA. See Richard G. Tarasofsky, International Biodiversity Law and the
International Trade Regime, presented at Panel Session on Multilateral Environmental
Agreements and Trade, IUCN/GETS Meeting, Geneva, Switzerland, Apr. 26, 1995 (on file
with author).
46. Tuna I, supra note 7, at 16-22 (submissions of the U.S.).
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GATT and its obligations under other multilateral agreements, although it
41
acknowledged that no such conflict had arisen in the Tuna I case.
The Tuna I panel suggested that the incidence of conflicting
international trade obligations could be prevented, but it gave no
indication as to whether a GATT panel should be seized of such matters.
Moreover, the Tuna I panel implied that, in the absence of a GATT
amendment or waiver, such conflicts might be resolved against such
competing obligations in the absence of any clear intention on the part of
the parties to the environmental agreement to have the latter prevail in the
event of any inconsistency with their GATT obligations.48
The impact of the Tuna I decision was exaggerated by some of its
critics, one of whom interpreted the ruling as follows: "The GATT Panel
decision narrowly limits the use of trade sanctions to enforce international
environmental agreements. This decision seriously undermines efforts to
protect not only marine mammals, but also critical resources such as the
ozone layer, endangered species, and tropical forests.'
49
However, in this case there was no international environmental
agreement being enforced. The measure in question was not based on the
listing of endangered species under CITES, nor any obligation thereunder.
In this conflict between trade and environment, there existed
international trade obligations, but no competing international
environmental or conservation obligations.0 The issue regarding the
relationship between GATT Articles XX(b) and (g) and international
environmental agreements remained an open question after Tuna I.
However, neither state sovereignty nor the prohibition of
extraterritoriality is infringed where the affected states agree that trade
restrictions may be employed to pursue specific environmental objectives.5
Although international environmental considerations cannot justify
restrictive trade practices under GATT Articles XX(b) and (g), 2 trading
partners may agree to subordinate their trade obligations in respect of
each other by entering into environmental agreements that demonstrate
clear intention on the part of the parties to have the environmental
47. Tuna 1, supra note 7, at 23 (submissions of Australia).
48. Id. at 45.
49. Christensen & Geffin, supra note 11, at 612.
50. See Ted L. McDorman, The 1991 U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel Report on Tuna and
Dolphin: Implications for Trade and Environment Conflicts, 17 N.C. J. INT'L. L. & COM.
REG. 461,478, and 483 (1992).
51. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 299-302 (2d ed.
1973).
52. See Tuna 1, supra note 7, at 45.
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
agreement prevail in the event of any inconsistency with their GATT
obligations. 3
The Shrimp decision, however, appears to suggest that trade measures
taken by a WTO member under a multilateral environmental agreement
to protect migratory species that occur within its territorial limits,
reasonably applied to other signatories of the same MEA, would meet the
standards set out in Article XX(g) and the Article XX chapeau. 4
Application of the measures to non-signatories in the absence of an effort
to reach a negotiated solution would clearly not. What remains unclear is
whether Article XX would save measures taken after efforts at a
negotiated solution have failed. The answer to this question would likely
depend on the subject matter and degree of global acceptance of the MEA• 55.
at issue, in addition to the reasons the negotiations failed.
VI. MEASURES APPLIED TO THIRD PARTIES
Two issues arise with respect to third parties: the application of trade
sanctions to intermediary nations that act as trans-shipment points and
MEA trade provisions to nations that are not parties to the MEA in
56question.
Under the MMPA, the United States gave itself the right to interfere
in trade between other parties, by providing for an embargo against
"intermediary nations" simply because they continued to buy products
which the United States had unilaterally decided should not be imported
53. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 59, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
54. Shrimp, supra note 7, at 56.
55. See Article 38 of the Vienna Convention: "Nothing in articles 34 to 37 precludes a
rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a customary rule of
international law, recognized as such." For a description of the process by which a rule
becomes a customary rule of international law, see Virginia Dailey, Sustainable
Development: Reevaluating the Trade vs. Turtles Conflict at the WTO, 9 J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
POL'Y 331 (2000). Commentators have suggested several criteria to determine whether
MEAs should be exempted from GATF scrutiny under a GAT waiver or binding
interpretation, including the number of parties to the agreement, the range of parties and
interests represented (such as developed, developing, importing and exporting), the
number of nations affected by the agreement who are parties, the distribution of benefits
and harms, and the provision of technical, financial or other assistance. See Chris Wold,
Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the GA TT: Conflict and Resolution?, 26 ENvTL.
L. 841 (1996).
56. The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, done at
Montreal, Sept. 16, 1987, as amended [hereinafter Montreal Protocol] for example, bans
trade in controlled substances between parties and non-parties. However, it does not
purport to impose a trade ban between non-parties.
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by itself or by any other country. Such a case had never arisen before the
GATT, was not provided for in the General Agreement, and, it was
argued, would be contrary to international law.57
The European Community argued that the very concept of
"intermediary nation" needed to be rejected because it would affect the
right of each contracting party to determine autonomously its own trade
policy. The EC refused to introduce trade measures against a state because
of a third country's requirements, or on the basis of that country's
unilaterally defined standards."
Similarly, Japan argued that its trade relations with Mexico should not
be subject to United States domestic law. The MMPA embargo was not
"primarily aimed at the conservation of" dolphins within the meaning of
Article XX(g) because an embargo on all yellow-fin tuna and tuna
products was not a dolphin conservation measure but a sanctions
mechanism to force other countries to adopt policies established
unilaterally by the United States. 9
The Tuna panels ruled that the prohibition of imports of Mexican
tuna from intermediary nations was contrary to GATI" Article XI:1 and
not justified by Articles XX(b) or XX(g). However, Tuna H and Shrimp
both found that the subject matter of measures aimed at protecting
resources outside a nation's territorial limits could fall within the ambit of
Article XX. While the measures in question were designed and
implemented in a manner that failed to meet the standard set out in the
Article XX preamble, the Shrimp decision in particular leaves the door
open for well-designed measures taken pursuant to MEAs.
There is support for the view that "an international treaty, which
explicitly states that it is modifying the GATI obligations, would do so for
those countries party to the newer treaty." 6 However, no single state
would have the authority to dictate the terms of trade between other
nations under international law.
It has also been argued that in some situations conservation and
environmental agreements can modify the GATT without an explicit
modification statement, even with respect to non-parties to such
agreements. 6' Thus, any expression of broad international support for the
57. Tuna 1, supra note 7, 16-17 (submissions of Mexico).
58. Tuna I, supra note 7, at 31 (submissions of the EC).
59. Tuna 1, supra note 7, at 33 (submissions of Japan).
60. See McDorman, supra note 50, at 483.
61. Id. at 484-85. McDorman argues that, with respect to CITES, GATF obligations
must be modified even for countries not a party to CITES, given the completeness of the
CITES regime, its obvious inconsistency with GATT, the narrowness of the exceptions to
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
modification of the GATT by environmental or conservation
61
considerations could suffice to suspend the operation of the GATT rules.
However, it is difficult to accept that such fundamental principles as privity
63
of contract and state sovereignty could be so easily overturned.
GAT thereby created, and the overwhelming international support for CITES, which has
more signatories than GATT.
62. Id. at 486. See also Vienna Convention, supra note 53, arts. 30, 34, 38, 59, and 64.
Article 64 provides that "If a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges,
any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates."
Article 53 (jus cogens) provides:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the
present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a
norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States
as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which
can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character.
If the relevant CITES provisions regarding trade in endangered species were accorded the
special status of jus cogens, like the prohibition of trade in slaves enjoys, those CITES
provisions would undoubtedly prevail over the GATT in the event of an inconsistency. See
BROWNLIE, supra note 51, 499-500. However, the proponent of a rule of jus cogens in
relation to Vienna Convention, Article 53, will have a considerable burden of proof to
meet. See id. at 501; see also T.O. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 179-84 (A.W.
Int'l Publishing Co. 1974).
63. The Latin maxim, privatis pactionibus non dubium est non laedi jus caeterorum
(there is no doubt that the rights of others [third parties] cannot be prejudiced by private
agreements) BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1076 (5th ed. 1979), is reflected in the GATT
amending formula. Article XXX:I provides:
Except where provision for modification is made elsewhere in this
Agreement, amendments to the provisions of Part I of this agreement or
to the provisions of Article XXIX or of this Article shall become effective
upon acceptance by all the contracting parties, and other amendments to
this Agreement shall become effective, in respect of those contracting
parties which accept them, upon acceptance by two-thirds of the
contracting parties and thereafter for each other contracting party upon
acceptance by it.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XXX:1, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. The
applicable rule of international law, which flows from the principle of state sovereignty, has
been clearly and authoritatively stated as follows: "The rule that a treaty cannot impose
obligations upon a 'third State' is well established." LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF
TREATIES 310 (Clarendon Press 1961). "A treaty may not impose obligations upon a State
which is not a party thereto." Article 18 of the Harvard Research Draft Convention on
Treaties. Id. at 310.
"A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent."
Vienna Convention, supra note 53, art. 48. There are few exceptions to this rule. The major
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Moreover, the rights of the contracting parties can only be modified by
agreement among the contracting parties themselves. 6' Nevertheless, the
combined effect of the evolution of the customary rules of interpretation
of public international law, the interpretive influence of the WTO
Preamble and the broad language of Article XX give WTO panels
considerable room to maneuver.
VII. THE LEAST-TRADE-RESTRICTIVE PRINCIPLE AND MEAs
In Tuna I, Australia argued that, under Article XX(b), as previously
interpreted,65 the United States was required to demonstrate that country-
specific import prohibitions on tuna were the only means reasonably
available to it to ensure the protection of dolphins, and that such measures
were the least GATT-inconsistent measures available. 66 Mexico argued
that the best way to protect dolphins was by international cooperation
67
among all concerned, not by way of unilateral trade measures.
It was not necessary for the panel to decide whether the trade
embargo was the least trade-restrictive means available to conserve
dolphins. However, it implied that there were less trade-restrictive
methods available to achieve that goal. It emphasised that the provisions
of the GATT impose few constraints on a contracting party's
implementation of domestic environmental policies, leaving each free to
tax or regulate imported products and like domestic products as long as its
taxes or regulations do not discriminate against imported products or
afford protection to domestic producers, including those imposed for
environmental purposes. 6 Moreover, it implicitly accepted Mexico's
argument that multilateral negotiation would be the preferable and less
trade-restrictive means of accomplishing international environmental
goals.
The Tuna IH panel also found that a measure cannot qualify as
necessary under Article XX(b) where there are other GATT-consistent
exception is set out in Article 38 of the Vienna Convention: "Nothing in articles 34 to 37
precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a
customary rule of international law, recognized as such." Id. art. 38.
64. See Tuna L supra note 40, at 45.
65. See Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes,
Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200, WT/DS10/R (Nov. 7, 1990), 30 I.L.M.
1122 (1991) [hereinafter Thai Cigarettes] (interpreting the meaning of the word
"necessary" in the context of Article XX(b)).
66. Tuna I, supra note 7, at 26 (submissions of Australia).
67. Tuna I, supra note 7, at 16-17 (submissions of Mexico).
68. Tuna I, supra note 7, at 45.
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alternatives available, which includes the negotiation of multilateral
agreements. Moreover, measures designed to force other nations to change
their environmental policies could neither be considered necessary under
Article XX(b) nor primarily aimed at the conservation of natural resources
under Article XX(g). The decision thus appeared to require the
negotiation of multilateral agreements before a measure could be
69
considered to be the least-trade-restrictive alternative available.
The Shrimp decision concluded that where an alternative course of
action is reasonably available, in this case multilateral negotiations, a
measure cannot qualify under the Article XX chapeau (preamble). It thus
appears that a measure cannot qualify under XX(g) where this less trade-
restrictive alternative is available. The Appellate Body did not express this
requirement in terms of the least-trade-restrictive test, but rather
considered the multilateral course of action to be an alternative to the
unilateral and non-consensual approach taken by the United States.
In its interpretation of Article XX(g) and the chapeau, the Appellate
Body in the Shrimp case adopted the interpretation of the Appellate Body
in the Reformulated Gasoline case." One commentator has suggested that
interpretation makes the requirements of the chapeau synonymous with
the "necessary" test under Article XX(b).7"
Regardless of how one interprets the WTO and GATT decisions with
respect to the least-trade-restrictive test, it seems clear that if the
negotiation alternative is not pursued before extraterritorial
environmental trade measures are imposed, the trade measures will not
qualify under Article XX(b) or XX(g).
The question that arises is whether a trade measure taken under a
multilateral environmental agreement would have to pass the least-trade-
restrictive test under Article XX(b) or XX(g). WTO jurisprudence suggest
that it would have to in order to meet the requirement under Article
XX(b) that the measure be "necessary."" However, the decision of the
Appellate Body in the Shrimp case suggests that trade measures applied
pursuant to a properly designed and well-implemented MEA would pass
the test of both Article XX(g) and the chapeau 3
69. See Tuna 11, supra note 7. See also Wold, supra note 55. For another environmentally
related WTO decision that applied the least-trade-restrictive requirement, see Gasoline,
supra note 42.
70. See Gasoline, supra note 42.
71. See Wold, supra note 55.
72. See Dailey, supra note 55.
73. For a discussion of applying MEA measures to parties and non-parties, see infra Part
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Anderson and Fried state the least-trade-restrictive principle as
follows: "[I]f one is pursuing environmental regulation,... one [must] do
so in the least trade-restrictive way possible without compromising the
environmental standard one has set for oneself.
7 4
It is reasonable to assume that this principle would apply to the
manner in which a state implements trade measures under an MEA.
Otherwise, the implementation process could be subject to abuse. The
implementation would have to be non-discriminatory and transparent, and
comply with the requirements for procedural fairness. However, it is
unlikely that the least-trade-restrictive test would be applied to second-
guess the substance of measures chosen by the parties to the MEA. The
WTO would have to show deference in this regard to the parties to the
MEA. Otherwise, the MEA would have to be renegotiated to comply with
the opinion of a WTO panel, a result that would be impractical and exceed
the jurisdiction of the panel.
Article 104 of the NAFTA provides a good example of how the least-
trade-restrictive principle can be applied to MEAs.
VIII. NAFTA ARTICLE 104: APPLYING THE LEAST-TRADE-
RESTRICTIVE RULE TO MEAs
The least-trade-restrictive principle applies to the use of MEA trade
measures under NAFTA Article 104. Article 104 deems trade measures
taken under listed international environmental agreements to be measures
relating to legitimate environmental objectives and deems them to be
necessary. However, Article 104 requires that "where a Party has a choice
among equally effective and reasonably available means of complying with
such obligations, the Party chooses the alternative that is the least
inconsistent with the other provisions of this Agreement." In order for a
measure to be the least inconsistent with the other provisions of the
NAFTA, it would have to be the least inconsistent with the free movement
of goods and services between the Parties; that is, the least trade-
restrictive.
Arguably, one of the implicit principles of the NAFTA, like the
GATT, is a general rule prohibiting the use of unilateral trade measures to
pursue extraterritorial environmental goals.75 However, Article 104
74. Jean Anderson & Jonathan Fried, The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement in
Operation, 17 CAN-U.S. L.J. 397, 403 (1991).
75. Extraterritoriality of laws means that the laws of a state are applied to persons, acts,
or property that are beyond its borders. J.G. CASTEL ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 442 (Edmond Montgomery 1986). NAFTA
Article 102(2) explicitly incorporates "applicable rules of international law" in the NAFTA.
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expressly permits the use of trade measures to pursue extraterritorial
environmental goals where such measures have been authorised by an
international environmental agreement and the NAFTA parties have
agreed that the trade obligations of such an agreement are to prevail over
inconsistent NAFTA obligations."
NAFTA, supra note 3, at 297. Under customary international law, "a state acts in excess of
its own jurisdiction when its measures purport to regulate acts which are done outside its
territorial jurisdiction by persons who are not its own nationals and which have no, or no
substantial, effect within its territorial jurisdiction." See BROWNLIE, supra note 51, 299-301.
This rule, regarding extraterritorial enforcement of measures, is an aspect of jurisdictional
competence. Jurisdiction flows from the general legal competence of states, often referred
to as "sovereignty." See id. at 291. This prohibition of extraterritoriality, which may also be
described as an aspect of the principle of non-intervention, would qualify as a "customary
rule of international law," within the meaning of Article 38 of the Vienna Convention.
Vienna Convention, supra note 53. See also BROWNLIE, supra note 51, at 302. Both the
GATT and the NAFTA would therefore have to be interpreted in a manner consistent with
the prohibition of extraterritoriality. A contrary interpretation would render either treaty
void under the jus cogens rule. See Vienna Convention, supra note 53, art. 53.
76. NAFTA Article 104 provides:
1. In the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and the
specific trade obligations set out in:
(a) Convention on the International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, done
at Washington, March 3, 1973;
(b) The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer, done at Montreal, September 16,
1987, as amended June 29, 1990;
(c) Base] Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their
Disposal, done at Basel, March 22, 1989, upon its
entry into force for Canada, Mexico and the United
States; or
(d) The agreements set out in Annex 104.1, such
obligations shall prevail to the extent of the
inconsistency, provided that where a Party has a
choice among equally effective and reasonably
available means of complying with such obligations,
the Party chooses the alternative that is the least
inconsistent with this Agreement (emphasis
added).
2. The Parties may agree in writing to modify Annex 104.1 to include any
amendment to the agreements listed in paragraph 1, and any other
environmental or conservation agreement.
Annex 104.1 currently lists only two agreements:
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Article 104 appears to represent a departure from the GATT, which
contains no equivalent provision. However, a closer examination reveals
that the legal regimes governing conflicts with environmental agreements
under the GATT and the NAFTA are not as different as they first appear
to be.
Neither the GATT nor any GATF panel decision has clearly set out
whether Articles XX(b) or (g) prevail over international environmental
agreements as between parties to both. The prevailing view of public
international law is that the later law supersedes the earlier,77 and that the
specific supersedes the general.7" Applying the latter principle, the more
specific trade obligations in the agreements listed in Article 104 would
supersede the GATT provisions under international law as between
parties to both.79 Moreover, GATT panels apply the same "least trade-
restrictive" test as NAFTA Article 104(1) to the implementation of
environmental policies. Article 104 thus represents a codification of what
the likely outcome would be were any of the listed agreements challenged
before a WTO panel.
(1) The Agreement between the Government of Canada and the
Government of the United States of America Concerning the
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste, signed at Ottawa,
October 28, 1986, and
(2) The Agreement between the United States of America and the
United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and
improvement of the Environment in the Border Area, signed at La
Paz, Baja California Sur, August 14, 1983.
NAFTA, supra note 3, at 297.
77. See BROWNLIE, supra note 51, at 603, where the author states, "it is to be presumed
that a later treaty prevails over an earlier treaty concerning the same subject matter .. "
See MCNAIR, supra note 63, at 219: "Where the parties to the two treaties said to be in
conflict are the same.... [i]f the provisions of the earlier one are general and those of the
later one are special and detailed, that fact is some indication that the parties intended the
special one to prevail." See also Vienna Convention, supra, note 53, art. 30, 59.
78. "[Where] one treaty contains general provisions and the other special provisions in
pari materia .... the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant comes into play-that is to
say, 'the specific prevails over the general."' MCNAIR, supra note 63, at 219.
79. For example, it is unlikely that the GATT would be interpreted to "liberalize" trade
in endangered species. Article VIII of CITES requires the parties to penalize trade in
specimens in violation of the Convention. Such a specific provision would prevail over the
GATT's more general trade obligations under international law. The fact that CITES is
given priority under NAFTA Article 104(1)(a) thus represents a codification rather than an
innovation.
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XI. CONFLICTS BETWEEN NAFJA OBLIGATIONS AND NON-LISTED
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS
The NAFIA provides no express permission or prohibition regarding
the unilateral assertion of jurisdiction over extraterritorial environmental
matters via the imposition of trade restrictions. However, Article 104
provides express permission to do so pursuant to specific international
conservation and environmental agreements. Since the NAFTA provides
no express permission to use trade restrictions to unilaterally assert
jurisdiction over extraterritorial environmental matters, but expressly
permits such measures to be taken pursuant to universally accepted °
multilateral agreements, the implication is that the NAFTA, like the
GATT, prohibits the unilateral use of trade restrictions to pursue
extraterritorial environmental goals. Unlike the GATT, the NAFTA
expressly permits a state to use trade restrictions to address environmental
matters that occur outside its national territory, by international
agreement. In this regard, the distinction between measures taken under
international agreements and measures taken unilaterally is key to
determining whether trade restrictions may be employed. Article 104 thus
codifies the requirement implicit in the Tuna and Shrimp decisions that
such measures must expressly or implicitly be intended to prevail over
trade obligations, by agreement among the affected trading parties.
Article 104 implies that, where there is a conflict between trade
obligations under NAFFA and environmental obligations under other
agreements, the NAFTA obligations prevail unless the competing
agreement is listed in Article 104 or Annex 104.1. The anticipated
inclusion of further bilateral and multilateral environmental agreements in
Article 104, via Annex 104.1, implies further that efforts to conclude such
agreements between the NAFTA parties are to precede, and indeed
replace, any resort to unilateral trade action. This would be consistent with
the view, expressed in the Tuna and Shrimp cases, that such efforts to
achieve negotiated resolutions must be pursued before trade restrictions
could qualify under GATT Article XX. The NAFTA parties have agreed
that trade restrictions may be used to implement the policy objectives of
the agreements listed in Article 104, provided that the trade action in
question is specifically authorised by one of the agreements listed in
Article 104. Article 104 is therefore consistent with the Tuna and Shrimp
interpretations of the GATr. Likewise, the Article 104(1) requirement to
use the least trade-restrictive means of implementing international
80. This term refers to universal acceptance by the NAFTA parties, evidenced by
inclusion in Article 104 or Annex 104.1. See NAFTA, supra note 3, at 297.
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environmental obligations duplicates the same test that is implicit in
Articles XX(b) and (g), as interpreted by GATT and WTO panels."
Under the NAFTA, trilateral negotiation is the rule, not unilateralism
of the kind seen in the Tuna and Shrimp cases. For example, Article 906(1)
requires the parties to "work jointly to enhance the level of ... protection
of ... the environment" with respect to product standards. 8' With respect
to the setting of domestic process standards, of which the rules regarding
tuna fishing are an example, Article 1114 provides that consultations, not
trade barriers, should be used to resolve disputes over the stringency of
such standards in each country.83 The NAFTA preamble also implies a
policy that prefers political solutions to conflicts between trade and the
environment over unilaterally legislated solutions.
The NAFTA thus confirms the approach taken to unilateral
extraterritoriality in the Tuna and Shrimp cases, and is consistent with the
view expressed by the GATT and WTO on this issue in its reports on trade
and the environment.3 The NAFIA adopts a consensual approach to
international environmental protection that may be summed up as follows:
International environmental considerations cannot justify restrictive trade
practices, except where these are introduced in terms of specific provisions
• 81
in a universally accepted environmental convention.
81. This is implicit in the requirement in Article 104 that, "where a Party has a choice
among equally effective and reasonably available means of complying with such
obligations, the Party chooses the alternative that is the least inconsistent with this
Agreement." See NAFTA, supra note 3, at 297.
82. Article 906(1) provides a framework for the upward harmonization of standards,
while Articles 906(2) and 906(3) provide a framework for compatibility of standards subject
to the condition that it not result in downward harmonization. Id. at 397.
83. Article 1114(2) discourages parties from relaxing domestic environmental measures
to attract or retain investment, and provides for consultations where one party believes this
has occurred. Article 1114(1) confirms the right of each party to determine the measures it
considers appropriate to ensure investment in its territory is undertaken in a manner
sensitive to environmental concerns. NAFTA, supra note 3, at 642.
84. GATT Secretariat, Report on Trade and Environment, GATT B.I.S.D. (40th Supp.)
at 78-79 (1992). The report states:
In principle, it is not possible under GATT's rules to make access to one's
own market dependent on the domestic environmental policies or
practices of the exporting country ... if the goal is to influence
environmental policies and practices in other countries, the option which
is most consistent with orderly international relations is inter-
governmental cooperation leading to a multilateral agreement. Id.
85. My description of the NAFTA approach to extraterritoriality is inspired by an
Indian proposal that "[g]lobal environmental considerations cannot justify restrictive trade
practices, except where these are introduced in terms of specific provisions in a globally
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This principle encourages nations to resolve international
environmental issues by persuasion and negotiation rather than by trade
actions. However, once the necessary agreements have been reached and
incorporated into the NAFTA, they may be enforced by way of trade
restrictions, provided those trade restrictions are the least trade-restrictive
means available to achieve the environmental goal.
X. DOES THE WTO NEED A CONFLICTS CLAUSE?
Behind much of the debate over trade and MEAs, particularly among
advocates of unilateralism, lies the concern that trade rules may impede
efforts to address serious global environmental problems, such as climate
change and ozone depletion.8 The starting point for the arguments of
many commentators is the assumption that the WTO/GATT decisions
have produced unsatisfactory results because they failed to see the justice
in allowing the United States to unilaterally determine how to deal with
multilateral environmental issues.
7
It is clear that unilateral trade measures aimed at coercing other
nations to adopt specific environmental policies in the absence of any
multilateral agreement will not be GAF-consistent. One nation cannot
accepted environmental convention." McDorman, supra, note 10, at 479 n.112. This is
essentially the approach taken in NAFTA Article 104.
86. See, e.g., Sean Fox, Responding to Climate Change: The Case for Unilateral Trade
Measures to Protect the Global Atmosphere, 84 GEO. L.J. 2499 (1996) (expressing the view
that "economic and legal arguments strongly support allowing states to use trade measures
when necessary to promote their legitimate interests in protecting the global atmosphere");
see also Bernazani, supra note 17 (who proposes the addition of an exception to Article XX
that would allow unilateral trade action where there is no MEA in place, there is a critical
environmental situation, and negotiation efforts have failed to find a multilateral solution);
Hudnall, supra note 17 (who notes that some kinds of unilateral measures are permitted in
Article XX, subject to jurisdictional limitations). For example, Article XX(e) permits trade
restrictions relating to the products of prison labour and Article XX(f) permits trade
restrictions imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or
archeological value. The former is likely to take the form of import restrictions while the
latter is likely to take the form of export restrictions.
87. For a discussion of this issue that takes into account the developing country
perspective, see Rita M. Wisthoff-Ito, The United States and Shrimp Import Prohibitions:
Refusing to Surrender the American Goliath Role in Conservation, 23 MD. J. INT'L L. &
TRADE 247 (1999). It is worth noting that the U.S. has agreed to avoid the unilateral
resolution of trade disputes under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 in order to comply
with its WTO obligations. See United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974
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unilaterally dictate what the environmental policies of other nations should
be. Global environmental issues cannot be resolved unilaterally.
The work of the GAT and WTO on trade and environment has
consistently expressed a preference for multilateral solutions over
unilateral actions. The Group on Environmental Measures and
International Trade8 concluded that multilateral solutions to
transboundary or global environmental problems would prove more
effective and durable than unilateral measures. 9 More recently, the WTO
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) reported that most member
delegations considered that GATT Article XX did not permit a member to
impose unilateral trade restrictions to protect the environment outside its
jurisdiction.9
The Shrimp case indicates that trade measures taken pursuant to
MEAs between parties to the MEA, if ever challenged before a WTO
panel, will likely pass the test under Article XX(g) and the chapeau,
provided that they are non-discriminatory and adhere to principles of
transparency and procedural fairness.
The only outstanding issue is what would happen if such measures
were applied to nations who have chosen not to agree to the MEA after a
concerted effort to negotiate their inclusion. Put another way, what would
happen if a "rogue" WTO member chose to threaten the global
environment?
The Montreal Protocol provides a good example of an MEA that
addresses an environmental issue of global concern in an effective way.
The issue of ozone depletion is truly global-all nations need the
protection of the ozone layer. Not surprisingly, the Protocol enjoys wide
acceptance among the nations of the world. The Protocol not only bans
trade in ozone-depleting substances and products between members, but
requires parties to cease such trade with non-parties as well.91 However,
88. This group was the first institutional framework created by the GATT to address
trade and environmental issues. It was created in 1971, but did little work in this area until
some twenty years later. See GATT Secretariat, Trade and Environment in the
GATT/WTO, in TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT SPECIAL STUDIES 67 (Hakan Nordstrom &
Scott Vaughan eds., 1999) [hereinafter Background Note].
89. Report by Ambassador H. Ukawa (Japan), Chairman of the Group on Environmental
Measures and International Trade, 49th Session of the Contracting Parties, in TRADE AND
ENVIRONMENT SPECIAL STUDIES 88 (Hakan Nordstrom & Scott Vaughan, eds., 1999)
[hereinafter Ukawa Report].
90. Background Note, supra note 88, para. 55. Another delegation expressed the opinion
that nothing in Article XX indicated that it only applied to environmental protcction within
the territory of the country invoking the exception. Id.
91. For a thorough discussion of the Montreal Protocol and other major MEAs that
contain trade provisions, see Wold, supra note 55. For an inventory of MEAs that contain
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the Protocol also contains provisions for developed countries to assist
developing countries, requiring technology transfer and financial
cooperation. A Multilateral Fund finances additional costs developing
countries may incur when implementing ozone-friendly technology.
Many commentators have suggested that the WTO be amended to
explicitly favour these kinds of MEA trade provisions. Few commentators
have proposed that the MEAs are the appropriate place for such a
conflicts provision. Wold argues that the principles of treaty interpretation,
specifically lex posterior and lex specialis, are difficult to apply in practice
to resolve conflicts between MEAs and the WTO.92 Thus, conflicts clauses
in MEAs would be "extremely useful" in his view.
Several WTO mechanisms already are in place to deal with MEA-
WTO conflicts should they arise-a waiver of GATT obligations may be
granted if approved by a three-fourths majority93 or a simple majority may
issue Decisions and Interpretations (XXV). 94 The Shrimp decision
indicates the openness of the Appellate Body to considering MEAs in its
interpretation of the GATT.95 Indeed, it was the reference to such
agreements in the Decision on Trade and Environment that seems to have
encouraged the Appellate Body to consider the provisions of MEAs in
reaching its decision.
Fletcher advocates the negotiation of an agreement on the
interpretation of Article XX along the lines of a proposal made by the
trade measures and the WTO members who are parties and non-parties, see WTO,
Committee on Trade and Environment, Matrix on Trade Measures Pursuant to Selected
MEAs, WT/CTEIW/160, (Aug. 15, 2000). The majority of WTO members are parties to the
major MEAs.
92. See Wold, supra note 55; see also supra notes 75-76. The GATT Group on
Environmental Measures and International Trade discussed the possible hierarchy of
international agreements under principles of international law, namely that if two
agreements have the same membership on the same subject, the later and/or more specific
one would take precedence. However, it chose not to pursue this approach, since it was
beyond the mandate of the group and no challenge had been brought before the GATF
against trade measures applied in the context of an MEA. See Ukawa Report, supra note
89, 15.
93. See WTO Agreement, supra note 5, art. IX(3), (4); see also GAT, supra note 2, art.
XXV; Wold, supra note 55.
94. See GATT, supra note 2, art. XXV; Wold, supra note 55.
95. The Appellate Body reviewed provisions of the following MEAs to support its
argument in favour of multilateral solutions to resolve transboundary environmental issues:
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, Convention on Biological
Diversity, Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals and the
Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles. See
Shrimp, supra note 7, at 19, 37, and 49.
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European Union. The EU proposal included a provision that would
explicitly resolve potential conflicts along the lines of NAFTA Article 104.
However, both developed and developing country members of the WTO
rejected the proposal. Some nations believed that the existing provisions
were adequate to resolve any conflicts that might arise, while others feared
that this would allow developed countries to use environmental measures
to decrease market access.97
Dailey argues persuasively that the principle of sustainable
development has become accepted as a rule of customary international
law. As such, the principle obliges nations to exploit their resources in a
matter that is sustainable.8 She further notes the inclusion of the principle
of sustainable development in the WTO Preamble. Dailey advocates the
interpretation of Article 3(2) of the DSU to require panels to interpret the
WTO agreements in accordance with customary rules of public
international law, rather than simply the customary rules of interpretation
of customary international law. She draws support for this view in the
statement of the Appellate Body in Reformulated Gasoline that the GATT
cannot be read "in clinical isolation from public international law." She
also advocates an interpretation of the necessity test in Article XX(b) to
require substantially equivalent environmental effectiveness of the less-
trade-restrictive alternative.
However, the decision of the Appellate Body in the Shrimp case
indicates that the WTO has already moved in the direction proposed by
Dailey. The Appellate Body employed the new WTO preamble reference
96. See Charles R. Fletcher, Greening World Trade: Reconciling GA TT and Multilateral
Environmental Agreements Within the Existing World Trade Regime, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
POL'Y 341, 359 (1996). The EU proposal included the following elements: (1)
"establishment of measures to ensure the effective implementation of measures to protect
the environment, including the Basel Convention, the Montreal Protocol and CITES;" (2)
"development of an interpretive document for GATT Article XX to set out clear criteria
on the use of trade measures to enforce multilateral environmental agreements, including
circumstances under which trade sanctions taken pursuant to a MEA, and applied to a
GATT member which did not sign the MEA, can go against other GATT obligations;" and
(3) "clarification of the circumstances under which the production process methods will
qualify as GATT Article XX exceptions."
97. See Wold, supra note 55; see also Report (1996) of the Committee on Trade and
Environment, in TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT SPECIAL STUDIES 98 (Hakan Nordstrom &
Scott Vaughan, eds., 1999).
98. See Dailey, supra note 72. Dailey acknowledges that the scope of the principle
remains controversial, and adopts the consensus view as to the four core principles of
sustainable development: intergenerational equity (preserving resources for the benefit of
present and future generations), sustainable use (exploitation of resources at sustainable
levels), equitable use (which takes into account the needs of other states), and integration
(integrating environmental concerns into economic and other decision-making processes).
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to sustainable development, contrasting it with the old GATT preamble, in
order to justify the U.S. measure as a legitimate natural resource
conservation measure. It made reference to CITES as proof that the
species of turtle in question were exhaustible. Most importantly, it
displayed a willingness to include multilateral efforts to protect migratory
species under the Article XX(g) exception. Since several panels have
already indicated that multilateral efforts are the primary less-trade-
restrictive alternative to unilateral trade embargoes, it is difficult to see
why the least-trade-restrictive principle needs to be re-interpreted to deal
effectively with MEA trade measures.
It seems neither necessary nor feasible to introduce an MEA conflicts
clause in the WTO at the moment. While provisions such as NAFTA
Article 104 may be useful in regional trade agreements, such a provision
would be problematic in the WTO given the diversity of its membership.
Moreover, both developed and developing country members of the WTO
have rejected such a proposal. The more appropriate place to negotiate
conflicts clauses is in the MEAs that employ trade measures to achieve
environmental goals.
XI. CONCLUSION
The general conclusion that can be drawn from the provisions of the
WTO Agreement, in particular the preamble, the Decision on Trade and
Environment and GATT Article XX, is that trade measures taken
pursuant to MEAs are permissible. However, unilateral trade measures
aimed at changing the environmental policies of other nations are not. In
both legal and practical terms, this is most appropriate. Differences in
environmental conditions, technological capacity, financial means,
economic priorities, and legal systems among the nations of the world
require a cooperative, multilateral approach to international
environmental issues. The effective conservation of migratory species and
the global commons requires the cooperation of all affected parties. The
wide acceptance of MEAs such as the Montreal Protocol suggests that the
nations of the world are indeed capable of finding creative, cooperative
solutions to environmental challenges of global importance.
Much of the literature on this issue from U.S. legal scholars appears to
take a common-law approach to analysing WTO jurisprudence. It is
important to recall that the principle of stare decisis does not apply to
decisions of WTO panels and that panel opinions on the potential GATF-
consistency of measures taken under MEAs is thus far only obiter dicta.
Nevertheless, decisions rendered in the Tuna and Shrimp cases will have
persuasive value in future decisions of WTO panels and the Appellate
Body. However, the primary focus of analysis must be on the provisions of
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the agreements themselves, which were drafted in a way that allows their
interpretation to evolve over time to deal with shifting global priorities and
the growing diversity of the WTO membership.
Recent interpretations of existing WTO provisions have opened the
door for multilateral environmental measures dealing with shared species
and resources to be justified as exceptions under Article XX. The Shrimp
decision suggests that nations may exercise shared jurisdiction over
migratory species and the global environment, although the exact scope of
that jurisdiction is yet to be defined. While it appears unlikely that trade
measures taken pursuant an MEA against parties to the MEA will be
challenged before the WTO, should such a case arise the measure would
probably meet the standards set out in Article XX. Should measures be
taken against non-parties, the outcome of a WTO challenge is less certain.
However, existing mechanisms are capable of dealing with such a situation,
notably waivers, decisions and interpretations. In some cases a rule set
forth in an MEA may become binding on non-parties as a customary rule
of international law, as set out in Article 38 of the Vienna Convention. As
such, it would influence the outcome were such a challenge to come before
a WTO panel.
There appears to be no need to introduce immediate changes to the
WTO regime in order to deal with hypothetical conflicts with MEAs. In
particular, it does not appear to be either necessary or feasible to introduce
an MEA conflicts clause in the WTO. While such provisions may be useful
in regional trade agreements, they would be problematic in the WTO
given the diversity of its membership. However, greater use of conflicts
clauses in MEAs would be a step in the right direction.

